When Diplomacy Fails Podcast

1956 Episode 2.12 takes us to the 22-24 October 1956, where the war plan that would create the Suez Crisis was created, developed and signed by Britain, France and Israel in an unassuming Parisian suburb.This process was, of course, far from straightforward or guaranteed to produce a result. It required the French reassuring both the Israeli and British representatives about the so

1956 Episode 2.11 finally takes us to that controversial moment when Britain, France and Israel began to move closer together.The Sevres Protocol was neither developed nor signed in a day, and in the first two weeks of October, negotiations critically important to the later conflict were underway. At first, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd hoped to make use of the UN Security Council

1956 Episode 2.10 takes us to the Commonwealth, seen as so vital to British interests, but fracturing over the question of the best course of action to take against President Nasser.The Canadian, Australian and NZ governments were all uneasy at the prospect of war, and some, like the Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, advocated a diplomatic approach. While Eden forged ahead

1956 Episode 2.9 looks at that moment which has become infamous in history – the collusion between Britain, France and Israel.We are almost ready to see these sneaky meetings take place, and for the infamous agreement take shape, but first, it is worth investigating another important and underrated angle of the Crisis. The key element of the Suez Crisis story that demonstrates ho

1956 Episode 2.8 examines the increasingly secretive plotting which took place behind the scenes in early autumn 1956.While Eden worked feverishly to make the conflict he desired come together, the countless variables continued to haunt him. We see here a glimpse of a common theme which will occupy us later on – the use of legal arguments to support the Anglo-French operation, on

1956 Episode 2.7 examines the steps which led towards the military intervention in Egypt, by placing the British behaviour in its imperial context.In spring 1955, Britain remained a premier power in the Middle East, while American representation in that theatre was not particularly impressive, save for the commercial connections which American citizens had with the different oil ba

1956 Episode 2.6 looks at the increasingly close cooperation between Britain and France in light of the signal defeat of Western imperialist ambitions in Egypt.We open our episode with a defining scene – President Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The nationalisation of the Canal was not the moment that the world flocked to condemn Nasser’s regime, as Anthony Eden m

1956 Episode 2.5 looks at British commitments in the Middle East, and how setbacks there could massively drag down ideas of British ‘prestige’ in that region.What did the French have to fear from Colonel Nasser, and how did this tie in with later Anglo-French agreements? The answers can be found here. Also of note in this episode is the moment when the Anglo-American loan to Na

1956 Episode 2.4 examines Britain's embarrassing and dissatisfying efforts to try and make Egypt see sense.Here we see what kind of Government Anthony Eden led, and how he shook it up, or failed to shake it up, after he assumed the premiership in spring 1955. Anthony may have deserved his turn, but he would quickly exhaust the sense of goodwill he had built up over the years. In sp

1956 Episode 2.3 examines British views of Suez and Nasser's new Egyptian regime.As the British government underwent a change and waved goodbye to great old men like Churchill, it was clear at the same time that this new government had no intention of changing its imperial tune. Egypt was a place to be held onto, not relinquished; Nasser was a figure to be loathed, rather than coop